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Attention bias modification (ABM), in which participants are trained to direct attention
away from negative information, has been shown to reduce anxiety. However, such
findings have been inconsistent. Changes in attentional bias are often absent,
suggesting need for further investigation of the underlying mechanisms of ABM, as
well as better statistical methods to analyze ABM data in order to reduce inferential
error. In this study, we (a) compared inhibition control training to standard ABM training
conditions, and (b) demonstrated the benefits of using simple Bayesian analyses to
analyze ABM data. We recruited 116 participants and assessed their attentional bias
prior to and after training, which involved practice avoiding negative stimuli, attending
to negative stimuli, or avoiding a non-emotional, exogenous attentional cue (inhibitory
control training). Our results suggested no impact of any of the training conditions on
attentional bias. We further demonstrate Bayesian analyses may help control for both
Type I and Type II error relative to a frequentist approach.
Keywords: attentional bias, attention bias modification, inhibition control, dot probe, Bayesian statistics
INTRODUCTION
The world provides stimulation beyond what we can process at any one time, and attention
mechanisms help us winnow this richness down to the select chunks of information that make up
our lived experience. We are not always in control of what those chunks are; some stimuli capture
attention because of their featural salience (Theeuwes, 1992), and some stimuli capture attention
because of their negative emotional meaning (MacLeod et al., 1986; Most et al., 2005; Onie and
Most, 2017). When the latter occurs, this is known as a negative attentional bias, and extreme
manifestations of this type of bias have been implicated in the development and maintenance of
emotional disorders such as anxiety and depression (Eysenck, 1992; Van Bockstaele et al., 2014).
The most widely used task for measuring attentional bias is the Dot Probe (MacLeod et al.,
1986). In a typical Dot Probe trial, a negative and a neutral stimulus (commonly words or images)
are briefly presented at separate screen positions. The stimuli then disappear, with one of the items
replaced by a probe to which the participant must respond. Response latencies are taken as an
indication of attentional allocation: a consistently quicker response on trials where probes replaced
the negative stimulus (congruent trials) than to trials where probes replaced the neutral stimulus
(incongruent trials) suggests preferential attention to the location of negative stimuli (i.e., a negative
attentional bias). Many studies have demonstrated that individuals high in anxiety vulnerability
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show an increased attentional bias to negative information
relative to individuals low in anxiety vulnerability (Bar-Haim
et al., 2007).
Past studies have suggested that training can reduce negative
attentional biases, with a consequent impact on emotional
vulnerability (Van Bockstaele et al., 2014). In training sessions,
the original Dot Probe task (used primarily for assessment)
is modified by introducing a contingency, such that probes
consistently replace either the negative stimulus or the neutral
stimulus in order to respectively, increase or attenuate attentional
biases to negative stimuli (Mathews and MacLeod, 2002).
This procedure has been implemented in clinical settings, and
successful reduction in negative attentional bias has been linked
with a reduction in anxiety symptomatology (MacLeod and
Clarke, 2015; Price et al., 2016). However, a persistent concern
within the Dot Probe ABM literature is that although studies
have demonstrated a reduction in anxiety when attentional bias
is successfully reduced, often this change in attentional bias is
not achieved (e.g., Clarke et al., 2014; Notebaert et al., 2015).
These findings underscore the need to better understand the
specific mechanisms contributing to attentional change in order
to improve training methods resulting in consistent outcomes.
One mechanism that may contribute to a negative attentional
bias is an impairment in inhibitory control. For example, past
studies have found that anxious individuals show a deficit
in inhibitory control measured using the anti-saccade task
(Derakshan et al., 2009; Wieser et al., 2009), a task which
requires the individual to inhibit reflexive eye-movements toward
a neutral stimulus on the screen. Specifically, Derakshan et al.
(2009) showed that high anxious individuals were slower than
low anxious individuals in the anti-saccade task, but showed
no difference in a pro-saccade task, in which the cue and the
target were in the same location. This suggests that anxious
individuals did not differ in initiating attention to a neutral
stimulus, but rather specifically in inhibiting the allocation of
attention to a salient distractor. Models such as the attentional
control theory (Eysenck et al., 2007; Eysenck and Derakshan,
2011) have postulated that anxiety-linked deficits in executive
control, specifically deficits in the inhibitory function, may play a
maintaining role in a negative attentional bias (see Heeren et al.,
2013 for a review).
Therefore, it is possible that ABM procedures achieve their
impact on attentional bias by training inhibitory control.
Consistent with this notion, previous research has shown that
individuals who were trained to attend away from threating
stimuli (e.g., words reflecting social threat) showed improved
performance in a post-training attentional control task (Chen
et al., 2015), suggesting that ABM training improved inhibitory
attentional control. There was no significant difference between
trials using negative, neutral or positive stimuli in the attentional
control assessment, suggesting that this increase in inhibitory
control was not emotion-specific. Furthermore, an fMRI study
showed that ABM increased neural activity in lateral frontal
regions, areas found to play a role in inhibitory control (Browning
et al., 2010), and another study found that by stimulating the
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (linked to attentional control)
attentional bias was more readily modified (Clarke et al., 2014).
Such findings are again consistent with the notion that one of
the mechanisms modified by ABM may be general inhibitory
control, and also consistent with recent suggestions that the
attentional biases often observed among clinical populations
actually reflect a more domain-general inefficiency of attentional
control (McNally, 2018).
One potential way to test whether increasing general
inhibitory attentional control contributes to reductions in
negatively biased attention similar to ABM procedures is to adapt
the anti-cueing task into a training task, similar in format to ABM
tasks. The anti-cueing task is a behavioral adaptation of the anti-
saccade task that uses response time as the dependent variable
instead of eye-movements. In the anti-cueing task, a single pre-
target cue appears, with the target then appearing in the opposite
location (Posner et al., 1982; Cain et al., 2014). This assessment
task can be adapted into a training task to reduce attentional
deployment to a non-emotional, but salient, pre-potent stimulus.
This might be achieved by presenting multiple trials in which
only a single neutral pre-target stimulus appears, with the target
then appearing in the opposite location. We hypothesize that by
training the individual to consistently orient away from a neutral,
pre-potent stimulus, it may be possible to train inhibitory control.
Because this training condition would not include emotional
stimuli, it may better target pure inhibitory control, without a
potentially additional role of emotion regulation.
Thus, in the current study, we sought to compare the impact of
inhibition control training to regular ABM training. Specifically,
we assessed whether inhibitory control training produced a
similar reduction in attentional bias as a standard avoid-negative
condition of the dot probe task. If inhibitory control alone can
contribute to attentional bias change in similar fashion as ABM,
it is predicted that, relative to an attend-negative ABM condition
(where no inhibitory control training is hypothesized to be
involved), the inhibitory control training and avoid-negative
training conditions should produce similar changes in attentional
bias.
An additional aim of the present study was to include analyses
to address a limitation of past studies. Specifically, inconsistent
outcomes of ABM studies (i.e., observations either of significant
change in attentional bias or of no significant change) may stem
from lack of power in any given study. A lack of power or
precision may lead to either (a) not enough power to detect a
true change (Type-II error), or (b) a lack of power leading to
spurious significant findings (Type-I error), potentially resulting
in inaccurate conclusions in low-powered studies (Button et al.,
2013). The low test-retest reliability of typical Dot Probe
measures (Schmukle, 2005) may also contribute to the issue of
power, as simulations demonstrate that low task reliability yields
lower power (Kanyongo et al., 2007). Therefore, since low power
may lead to inaccurate conclusions, better statistical methods are
needed to determine whether the study is underpowered.
As part of this study, we compared the use of a Bayesian
inference to a frequentist approach (the widely used approach
using p-values for inference) in analyzing post-ABM attentional
bias. Bayesian approaches are often capable of distinguishing
between lack of power/precision and lack of an effect, and
they have steadily garnered favor in many corners of the
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psychological literature (Andrews and Baguley, 2013). This
approach starts with a priori beliefs (“priors”) about the
direction or size of an effect, which are ultimately combined
with observations (evidence) and data to yield updated beliefs
(“posteriors”). This can be illustrated with an intuitive example:
if you only have superficial familiarity with a colleague who
always appears to be carefree, your impression of them might
change drastically the first time you encounter them in a
depressed state. In contrast, for those who know your colleague
better and who have a more well-rounded understanding of
them, witnessing the colleague’s depression might not change
their impression as much. In short, what we take away
from an event (posteriors) depends on our prior expectations
(priors), even if the event itself is held consistent (evidence).
It is worth noting that if all observers’ perceptions of your
colleague were absolutely identical after the depressive episode,
the observers would have identical posteriors of the event.
However, in most cases, the resulting posteriors will be
constrained by the initial priors. Ultimately the heart of Bayesian
inference is combining priors with current evidence to yield
posteriors.
Bayesian inference takes the form of model comparison,
evaluating the degree to which the data support one model
over the other (e.g., null vs. alternative), and asks the question:
‘how many times more likely is one model than the other?’
This is represented with a Bayes Factor, a numeric value that
represents how likely the alternative (H1) is relative to the
null (H0). For example, a Bayes factor of 10 suggests that
the alternative is 10 times more likely than the null, a Bayes
factor of 0.1 suggests that the null is 10 times more likely than
the alternative, and a Bayes factor of 1 suggests the null and
the alternative are equally likely, with insufficient evidence to
suggest one direction over the other. This contrasts with typical
p-values, which allow investigators to infer either that there is
evidence to support a claim (p < 0.05) or that there is not
enough evidence to support a claim (p > 0.05), and it is often
unclear whether the latter outcome indicates support for the
null or a lack of experimental- or statistical- power. In contrast,
Bayes factors allow researchers to distinguish between three
outcomes: support for the null, support for the alternative, or
ambiguous results. This is a useful way to distinguish between
the absence of an effect and absence of power. Note that,
here, power is defined not as the probability of detecting an
effect, but rather the precision of estimates stemming from the
amount of evidence collected. This is an important feature,
as low powered studies have been shown to lead to spurious
findings and a lack of reproducibility (Button et al., 2013). It
can be argued that this is a more objective measure of power
than a priori power analyses, since power is directly driven by
evidence in the present data rather than data collected in another
study or meta analyses, which may be prone to publication
bias.
In sum, this study had two main aims: to test whether
inhibitory control training produced a similar reduction in
attentional bias as a standard avoid-negative condition of ABM,
and to demonstrate the benefits of using Bayesian inference in
analyzing ABM data.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
120 participants (41 males, 79 females, Mage = 22.37, SDage = 4.23)
from the general community were recruited through an online
system (SONA) and were compensated AUD $15 for their time.
The sample size was determined a priori, drawing from
between-subjects effect sizes from past studies (η2 = 0.06–0.15;
e.g., Grafton et al., 2012; Clarke et al., 2014; Notebaert et al., 2015).
Power analyses performed in Clarke et al. (2017), using a similar
repeated measures design, suggested 105 participants would yield
80% power. This study was carried out in accordance with the
recommendations of ‘the Human Research Ethics Advisory Panel
at UNSW’ with written informed consent from all subjects.
All subjects gave written informed consent in accordance with
the Declaration of Helsinki. The protocol was approved by the
Human Research Ethics Advisory Panel.
Design
Participants completed a questionnaire indexing negative affect
followed by a pre-training Dot Probe measure of attentional
bias. Then, the participants were randomly allocated to one of
three between-subjects training conditions based on arrival time
to the lab (e.g., participants 1, 4, and 7 would be in the same
training condition). One training condition presented negative-
neutral stimulus pairs, combined with a contingency that
encouraged participants to attend toward the negative stimulus
(attend-negative condition). One presented negative-neutral
stimulus pairs, combined with a contingency that encouraged
participants to attend away from the negative stimulus (avoid-
negative condition). A third presented a single non-emotional
stimulus (rendering it salient), combined with a contingency
that encouraged participants to attend away from it (inhibitory
control training condition). All participants then engaged in a
post-training Dot Probe measure of attentional bias.
The study took the form of a single session training study to
assess the impact of inhibitory suppression on attentional bias.
Materials
Hardware
Stimuli were presented on a 24-in. BenQ XL2420T LED monitor
with 1920 × 1080 resolution and 120-Hz refresh rate. Head
position was not fixed.
Questionnaires
The Depression, Anxiety, and Stress Scale 21 (DASS-21;
Lovibond and Lovibond, 1995) was used to investigate whether
there were any pre-existing differences in negative affect amongst
the training groups. Participants had to indicate how much
statements applied to them over the past week e.g., “I found it
hard to wind down,” on a four-point scale ranging from ‘Did not
apply to me at all – NEVER,’ to ‘Applied to me very much, or most
of the time – ALMOST ALWAYS’. See Table 1 for cut-off scores.
Attentional Task Stimuli
For the negative-neutral stimulus pairs, 75 negative and 75
neutral images consisting of images of people and animals were
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taken from various sources, including web searches and the
International Affective Picture System (Lang et al., 1997), all
of which were then collectively rated by independent raters on
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. The negative images often depicted
mutilated bodies and disgust images (e.g., soiled toilets). Neutral
images often depicted people in everyday scenes as well as
household objects. One-hundred and ninety individuals rated
these images on two dimensions: valence and arousal.
To rate the valence, we asked the participants ‘How does
this image make you feel?’ to which they answered on a scale
ranging from −9 (extremely negative) to 9 (extremely positive).
For arousal, we asked the participants ‘how intense is this image?’
to which they responded on a scale ranging from 0 (not at all
intense), to 9 (extremely intense).
Likelihood ratio tests confirmed that negative images were
rated more negatively than neutral images χ(1) = 14,459,
p < 0.001, and that negative images were rated as more
intense than neutral images χ(1) = 12,736, p < 0.001 (Valence:
Mneg = −5.594, SDneg = 1.1512, Mneut = 1.186, SDneut = 0.853,
Arousal: Mneg = 6.155, SDneg = 1.168, Mneut = 1.887,
SDneut = 0.264).
For the inhibitory control training condition, images depicting
landscapes – absent of depictions of people or animals – were
used. We used photos of landscapes rather than simpler stimuli
so that naturalistic scenes were employed across all training
conditions.
The same stimulus set was used in the pre-training
attentional bias assessment task and the attentional training
task, using 50 of the 75 images from the neutral and
negative image pool each (except for the inhibitory control
training condition, which used only landscapes). Post-
training assessment used a different stimulus set (the
other 25 images from each of the neutral and negative
image pools) to ensure any training effects were associated
with the stimulus valence rather than the specific stimuli
themselves.
Attentional Bias Assessment Task
During pre-training and post-training assessment participants
were instructed to indicate the left/right direction of an arrow
probe using directional keys, and to try ignore the images that
would appear on the screen prior to the target arrow.
On each trial, a fixation cross appeared at the center of the
screen for 100 ms, followed by two 11.5 cm × 8.5 cm images
(a neutral and negative image) placed with their medial edges
7.5 cm above and below central fixation (15 cm from one
image’s edge to another). We used a 500 ms exposure time for
TABLE 1 | Cut-off scores for DASS-21, taken from Lovibond and Lovibond (1995).
Depression Anxiety Stress
Normal 0–9 0–7 0–14
Mild 10–13 8–9 15–18
Moderate 14–20 10–14 19–25
Severe 21–27 15–19 26–33
Extremely severe 28+ 20+ 34+
the images, consistent with past studies (Clarke et al., 2017).
The images disappeared to reveal an arrow (3.5 cm × 3.5 cm)
behind one of the images, which pointed either left or right
and remained until participants made a response indicating
the arrow’s direction. The two images were placed at the
top and bottom of the screen rather than left or right as
per recommendations to improve task reliability (Price et al.,
2015).
For each assessment phase, participants completed 120 trials
with a short break after 60 trials. Trial type (Congruent,
in which the probe appeared behind the negative stimuli,
vs. Incongruent, in which the probe appeared behind the
non-negative stimuli) and Probe type (arrow pointing left
or right) were equally and randomly allocated throughout.
In pre-training, 50 negative and 50 neutral images were
randomly distributed amongst 120 trials (each trial having
1 negative and 1 neutral image), resulting in each image
being presented 2–3 times. In post-training, 25 negative
and 25 neutral images were randomly distributed amongst
120 trials, resulting in each image being presented 4–5
times.
Training Task
During the training phase, participants completed 720 trials with
a short break after every 80 trials.
Trials and instructions were identical to pre-training
assessment except: In the attend-negative condition the
probe was always behind the negative stimuli, and in the
avoid-negative condition the probe was always behind
the neutral stimuli. We adopted this contingency based
on past studies (Grafton et al., 2014; Milkins et al., 2016;
Clarke et al., 2017). This was to train attention toward and
away from negative stimuli, respectively. In the inhibitory
control training condition, only one pre-probe stimulus
was present, and the probe always appeared in the other
location.
For avoid-negative and attend-negative training conditions,
participants were trained on the 50 images used in the pre-
training assessment randomly distributed amongst 720 trials. In
the inhibitory control condition, 50 images depicting landscapes
were used instead. A schematic of the different training
conditions can be found in Figure 1.
Procedure
Participants were tested in individual testing rooms.
All tasks were completed on computers, starting with
a demographics questionnaire and the DASS-21 on
Qualtrics (a website based survey tool). Next, participants
completed the pre-training attentional bias assessment,
before proceeding with the attentional training task.
They then finished with the post-training attentional bias
assessment. Participants were debriefed at the end of the
study.
Data Availability
Pre-registration of the aims, methods, and analysis plan, data, and
analysis output can be found at: https://osf.io/hfr9s/.
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FIGURE 1 | Schematic of training conditions. Image location (top and bottom), arrow location (top or bottom), as well as arrow direction (left or right) were
randomized.
RESULTS
Data Preparation
Accuracy for all participants and across congruency was high for
pre- and post-training (MAccuracy = 97.6%, SDAccuracy = 1.5%).
All participants met a pre-defined inclusion criterion of
MAccuracy > 80%.
Probe reaction times were prepared by removing all
observations faster than 200 ms and slower than 2000 ms.
On average, 2–3 trials were removed for each individual.
Following that, reaction times outside three standard deviations
from each participant’s own mean, separating pre and post
training, congruent and incongruent trials to eliminate outliers.
Attentional bias indices were then calculated separately for
pre- and post- training: aggregate scores for congruent trials
were subtracted from aggregate scores for incongruent trials.
A positive attentional bias index indicates a quicker response in
congruent trials relative to incongruent trials and suggests an
attentional bias toward negative stimuli. Five participants were
removed from analyses due to pre-training bias scores that were
three standard deviations or more from the mean.
Note that past studies have combined pre and post attentional
bias scores when eliminating outliers three standard deviations
from an individual’s own mean (e.g., Clarke et al., 2017). Our
pattern of results remains the same between both exclusion
methods.
Past studies have criticized the use of aggregate bias scores,
favoring other indices such as the bias variability score (Iacoviello
et al., 2014). However, simulations have found that these indices
can fluctuate without an actual attentional bias, and rather reflect
response time variability (Kruijt et al., 2018). Also, despite past
issues with reliability, aggregate bias indices have been shown to
be reliably associated with anxiety (Bar-Haim et al., 2007).
Seven participants did not have DASS-21 data due to a
system error in which their data were not recorded, and these
participants were not included in analyses involving DASS-
21. Overall, there were 40 participants in the avoid-negative
condition, 37 in the attend-negative condition, and 38 in the
inhibitory training condition.
Attentional Bias Analyses
We first report data analyses using a frequentist method and
follow this with a Bayesian analysis. In the interest of making
these analyses accessible, both analyses were done in JASP,
an open source software which includes both frequentist and
Bayesian analyses. This point and click software was developed to
introduce people to Bayesian analysis using a familiar interface.
Frequentist Analysis
First, we investigated whether there were any pre-existing
differences between individuals in the attend-negative, avoid-
negative, and inhibitory control conditions prior to training. We
performed a one-way ANOVA on the pre-training attentional
bias index, which showed no evidence for group differences,
F(2,112) = 0.219, p = 0.804, η2 = 0.004.
Next, we investigated whether there were any pre-existing
differences in negative affect between the different groups via a
similar one-way ANOVA on the DASS total score, as well as the
depression, anxiety, and stress subscales. The analysis revealed
no significant difference between the groups on any of the scales
or subscales, DASS: F(2,106) = 0.180, p = 0.835, η2 = 0.003;
DASS-D: F(2,106) = 0.018, p = 0.982, η2 < 0.001; DASS-A:
F(2,106) = 0.219, p = 0.804, η2 = 0.004; DASS-S: F(2,106) = 0.586,
p = 0.558, η2 = 0.011. See Table 2 for means and standard
deviations, and reliability indices.
To test whether there was a significant difference between the
impact of the three training conditions on attentional bias, we
performed a repeated measures ANOVA with time (pre and post
training) as a within subjects factor and training condition as a
between subjects factor. The analysis yielded no main effect of
time, F(1,112) = 0.160, p = 0.690, η2 = 0.001, nor a main effect
of training condition, F(2,112) = 0.523, p = 0.594, η2 = 0.009,
nor an interaction between time and condition F(2,112) = 1.151,
p = 0.860, η2 = 0.003. Therefore, we failed to reject the null
hypothesis that there was no impact of training on attentional
bias. However, note that it is unclear from this analysis whether
this reflects the absence of an effect or a lack of power to find an
existing effect, as we cannot give support for the null using the
frequentist analysis.
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TABLE 2 | Means and standard deviations of the Depression, Anxiety, and Stress
scale.
DASS total DASS-D DASS-A DASS-S
Mean 10.70 3.376 3.138 4.183
SD 8.919 3.310 3.081 3.675
Reliability 0.932 (0.928) 0.864 (0.853) 0.810 (0.794) 0.871 (0.869)
Reliability indices are McDonald’s ω, with Cronbach’s α in the brackets.
To ensure between-software consistency, the same analysis
was performed in SPSS, with the exact same outcome. The output
can be found in our osf page noted above. See Table 3 for
attentional bias means and Table 4 for reliability values.
Bayesian Analysis
Although Bayes Factors are often reported as BF10, which refers
to the probability of the alternative model against the null, here
we report findings using BF01, which is the probability of the
null relative to the alternative hypothesis (the inverse probability
of BF10: BF01 = 1/BF10). This is to help interpretability of the
Bayes factors for null findings; for example, ‘we are 15 times
more likely to find the null’ is more intuitively interpretable
than ‘we are 0.067 times more likely to see the alternative
hypothesis’. We used Jeffrey’s scale to interpret Bayes factors
(Jeffreys, 1961), which places labels on Bayes factors (e.g., BF = 1–
3 is anecdotal evidence, BF = 3–10 is moderate evidence and
BF = 10–30 is strong evidence). Whilst unlike the frequentist
approach there are no strong cutoffs, a Bayes Factor of 10 is often
used to indicate compelling evidence (Wagenmakers et al., 2015;
Aczel et al., 2018). The following analyses were done using the
Jeffreys-Zellner-Siow (JZS) default priors for ANOVA (Rouder
and Morey, 2012). Note that the default priors selected in JASP
has been shown to operate well with a wide range of ANOVA
designs and provides a good balance between very strong to
uncertain priors.
First, we investigated whether there were any pre-existing
attentional bias differences between the groups prior to
training. We performed a one-way ANOVA investigating group
differences and found moderate evidence to suggest there were
no pre-existing differences BF01 = 7.332.
Next, we investigated whether there were any pre-existing
differences in negative affect between the different groups.
We performed four one-way ANOVA to see whether different
training groups differed in their DASS subscale or total score.
The analysis revealed moderate to strong evidence that there
TABLE 3 | Attentional Bias Indices for three training conditions.
Training conditions Pre-Training
AB index
Post-Training
AB index
Attentional
bias change
mean
Avoid negative 1.256 (11.49) −0.484 (13.62) −1.740 (16.24)
Attend negative −2.918 (8.915) 0.376 (12.20) 3.295 (16.22)
Inhibitory control −0.623 (12.40) 0.575 (11.74) 1.204 (13.80)
All indices are in ms. Standard deviations are in brackets. AB, attentional bias.
were no pre-existing differences between the groups, DASS:
BF01 = 10.063, DASS-D: BF01 = 11.494, DASS-A: BF01 = 9.745;
DASS-S: BF01 = 7.238.
To test our main hypothesis, we performed a repeated
measures ANOVA with time (pre and post training) as a within
subjects factor and training condition as a between subjects
factor. The analysis revealed moderate evidence suggesting there
was no effect of time BF01 = 6.135, and strong evidence suggesting
there was no effect of training condition BF01 = 10.638. In
line with the model comparison nature of Bayesian statistics,
to obtain the evidence for the interaction term we divided the
Bayes Factor for the model containing the interaction term by
the Bayes Factor for the model with only the main effects.
The analysis yielded strong evidence suggesting there was no
interaction BF01 = 10.417.
Insufficient Power May Lead to Inaccurate
Conclusions
To illustrate the relative ability of Bayesian and frequentist
approaches to distinguish lack of effect from lack of precision,
we repeated both the frequentist and Bayesian analysis, and
we intentionally reduced precision and power by reducing
sample size to a sample commonly observed in early attentional
bias modification research (Mathews and MacLeod, 2002). We
repeated the above-described frequentist and Bayesian analysis
1000 times, testing for group differences in attentional bias
change while restricting the analyses to 15 randomly selected
samples (participants) in each condition. We then obtained a
percentage of the results which were considered significant in the
frequentist tradition (p < 0.05) and a percentage of the results
that had strong evidence in the Bayesian framework (BF10> 10).
From the 1000 iterations of this analysis, we found that 1.6% of
the frequentist analyses yielded significant results (Type I error)
and 98.4% would have concluded that there was no effect (a
potential Type II error due to low power), In contrast, using the
Bayesian framework, 0.1% of the Bayes Factors suggested there
was a strong effect, 0.1% suggested strong evidence for a lack of
an effect, and 99.8% suggested there was only either anecdotal or
moderate evidence in either direction.
DISCUSSION
In this study, we had two overarching aims: to investigate whether
training participants to ignore pre-potent, non-emotional stimuli
would yield similar results to training individuals to ignore
negative stimuli, and to demonstrate the utility of using Bayesian
analyses to analyze post-ABM attentional bias.
Our results suggest a single session of inhibition training
(i.e., training participants to ignore pre-potent, non-emotional
stimuli) did not shift attentional bias in healthy participants in
either the Frequentist or the Bayesian analysis. However, there
was also no significant bias change in either of the two other
training conditions, limiting our ability to rule out the possibility
that inhibition training had no impact similar to those frequently
reported in the attentional bias modification literature. Notably,
the absence of attentional bias change in the attend-negative and
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TABLE 4 | Reliability indices of Dot Probe scores.
Training condition Pre-Training Post-Training
Cong Incong AB index Cong Incong AB index
Attend negative 0.81 (0.98) 0.78 (0.98) 0.51 (0.78) 0.59 (0.96) 0.81 (0.97) 0.53 (0.76)
Avoid negative 0.97 (0.99) 0.5 (0.99) 0.50 (0.81)
Inhibition 0.66 (0.95) 0.65 (0.96) 0.44 (0.69)
Cong refers to the congruent trial type, Incong refers to the incongruent trial type. AB index reliability indices are computed by averaging across reliability indices obtained
from differences scores from 100 different combinations of within participant incongruent – congruent scores. Values are McDonald’s ω, whilst values in brackets are
Cronbach’s α.
avoid-negative training conditions is consistent with a number
of previous studies that have also failed to achieve significant
changes in attention bias using tasks based on the traditional dot
probe paradigm (Clarke et al., 2014, 2017; Everaert et al., 2015;
Notebaert et al., 2015). This underscores the need to understand
the processes via which bias change is achieved, and also to
explore potentially alternative ways of changing attention bias.
There could be several potential reasons as to why there was
no significant bias change. One potential reason there was no
reduction of attentional bias in the ‘avoid negative’ condition is
that we only used healthy participants without pre-screening for
anxiety. It is also possible that multi-session, high dose retraining
sessions are required to reliably modify attention. However,
past studies have found success in modifying attentional biases
within a single session in healthy participants (e.g., Chen et al.,
2015). Therefore, we have reason to believe that rather than
simply increasing the dose, we need to further investigate the
underlying mechanisms for attentional bias change to achieve
consistency in modifying attention. In addition, we sought to
investigate whether inhibition training could account for some of
the previously observed patterns in the avoid-negative condition,
and other studies that have reported success using one session of
ABM training have typically included fewer training trials than in
the present study.
Other potential reasons may lie with our specific
methodology. One possibility is that button press reaction times
may be too crude of a measurement to assess the differences
present in these biases. Instead, other implicit measures of
attention such as eye tracking could be used. Another possibility
is that inhibitory control training did not generate change due to
using images depicting landscapes. We initially chose to use these
images so that naturalistic scenes were used across all training
conditions. We did not have these images rated for valence, but
note that past studies have used these images as neutral controls,
demonstrating a differential impact to emotional images (e.g.,
Most et al., 2005; Onie and Most, 2017; Jin et al., 2018). Finally,
in our study, we specifically instructed individuals to ignore
the images appearing before the probe, but in previous studies
participants tended not to be explicitly instructed to ignore the
images (e.g., Basanovic et al., 2017; Clarke et al., 2017). Therefore,
it is possible that instructions to explicitly ignore these images led
participants to exert attentional control in a way that reduced the
impact of the emotional images themselves. This may be a more
likely possibility among healthy participants (as in our study)
than among highly anxious individuals, who have previously
exhibited deficits in attentional control (Eysenck et al., 2007;
Eysenck and Derakshan, 2011). It is possible that this contributed
to our finding that traditional ABM training conditions did not
modify attention. That is, the images themselves may not have
captured attention in the first place, resulting in no consequence
of the contingency manipulation.
Furthermore, one issue previously noted is that studies have
found the Dot Probe to have low reliability, which may have
contributed to previous null findings. Although the reliability of
the attentional bias indices in our study (0.50–0.53) are higher
than those reported elsewhere in the literature, they are still lower
than the recommended 0.7 cut-off (Nunnally, 1978), potentially
affecting our findings. In this study, we used McDonald’s Omega
to compute reliability instead of Cronbach’s Alpha, which is
commonly used in the attentional bias literature. We opted to
use McDonald’s Omega, as Cronbach’s alpha has shown to be less
accurate in the face of violated assumptions, whilst the Omega is
less so (Zinbarg et al., 2005). In our case, Cronbach’s Alpha almost
always overestimates the reliability value.
Despite the fact that the Dot Probe has been heavily criticized
for its lack of reliability, a recent study found that reliability may
not be the best way to evaluate the usefulness of a task. Reliability
indices can be heavily affected by between participant-variability,
and many cognitive tasks with reliable effects may yield low
reliability (Hedge et al., 2018). The authors of that study noted
that any calculation designed to reduce noise, e.g., obtaining
a bias index by subtracting two values, would almost always
reduce between-participant variability, and therefore reliability.
Consistent with this, one issue is that not all ABM studies
report reliability indices, including those that have found training
effects. Therefore, at this time, it is difficult to evaluate the role of
reliability in the current context.
In addition to the traditional ABM training conditions,
the inhibition control training also did not modify attentional
bias. One possibility is it that inhibition training, even if
successful, does not causally influence attentional bias. In one
study, Heeren et al. (2015) did find that a two session ABM
training program improved executive control as measured by
the Attention Network Task (Fan et al., 2005), but it may be
that this causal relationship is unidirectional. ABM training
may improve attentional control, consistent with hypotheses
by Chen et al. (2015) and McNally (2018), but attentional
training may not modify attentional bias. This is a possibility
that should be addressed by future research, which would also
benefit from delineating between spatial attentional control
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and executive control, as Heeren et al. (2015) found that
ABM modified executive control, but not spatial attentional
control. In addition, future studies could also benefit from
having pre and post measures of inhibitory control to see
whether manipulations of inhibitory control were successful or
not.
One potential issue is that traditional attentional retraining
conditions have two stimuli on the screen during training
whilst the current inhibitory control training condition had
only one. Thus, it could be argued that this stimulus-
level difference impedes easy comparison across the training
conditions. However, attentional training in the ‘inhibitory
control’ condition is based on the well-validated anti-cueing task,
which involves reorienting away from a pre-potent, attention-
grabbing stimulus. Furthermore, the presence of one- versus two-
stimuli in the training conditions does not account for our failure
to observe a difference between the attend- and avoid- negative
groups.
An additional avenue for future research might be to assess
whether inhibitory control can improve performance in non-
spatial indices of attentional bias, such as emotion-induced
blindness (Most et al., 2005), which has been shown to have
higher test-retest reliability than typically seen with the dot probe
(Onie and Most, 2017). It will also be informative to investigate
whether inhibitory control mediates the effect of training on
attentional bias by assessing attentional control (Basanovic et al.,
2017) after training but prior to the assessment of attentional bias.
Importantly, we used Bayesian inference to analyze the
robustness of the attentional bias assessment data that was
obtained after attentional bias modification. Both the frequentist
and Bayesian approach indicated no training effects when
using the full sample. However, the Bayesian approach also
distinguished between a lack of an effect and a lack of power, with
the resulting Bayes factors suggesting strong evidence to support
the null. This was further bolstered when we intentionally
reduced power by reducing the sample size to match the sample
size used in previous studies, in which we found that over 1000
iterations, the frequentist analysis yielded a 1.6% Type I error, and
potentially 98.4% type II error due to low power. The Bayesian
approach yielded a 0.1% Type I error, and 0.1% Type-II error,
whilst suggesting there was either only anecdotal or moderate
evidence 99.8% of the time. In the frequentist analysis, a non-
significant p value was unable to indicate whether there was true
lack of an effect, or a lack of precision. However, the Bayes Factor
was sensitive to how much evidence was collected, therefore
indicating a measure of precision as well. This demonstrates
one of the strengths of the Bayesian approach, which quantifies
evidence rather than utilizing a specific cut-off. Note that in this
analysis we did use a cut-off of BF = 10 to aid in comparing
the two approaches; however, in practice, the Bayes Factor is
used to quantify evidence, e.g., we would be able to make
stronger conclusions with a Bayes Factor of 9 than a Bayes
Factor of 3.5, despite falling into the same bracket in Jeffrey’s
scale. An interesting finding is that the frequentist approach
to this analysis only yielded 1.6% Type-I error, successfully
controlling for error at α = 0.05. Therefore, our results seem
to suggest that the frequentist approach is not invalid in and
of itself in controlling for Type I error. However, this analysis
method may prove difficult in controlling for Type II error. Power
analyses have been used to reduce these concerns; however,
sample size estimates from power analyses rely on effect size
estimates from past findings, which may be subject to a number
of issues such as publication bias or simply random differences in
samples.
It is worth noting that JASP is designed as an introduction to
Bayesian statistics, and therefore still has limited functionality,
e.g., a lack of a graphical representation of the posterior
distributions. Therefore, we highly encourage readers to pursue
further Bayesian approaches using programs such as JAGS and
winBUGS. There are several great resources and books that
discuss these topics (e.g., Kruschke, 2015).
In conclusion, we set out to compare the outcome of
inhibition training with traditional ABM training conditions
and found that inhibition training appeared to have no
impact on attentional bias. However, the interpretability of
this manipulation is limited due to the lack of change in
attentional bias in the more traditional attentional bias training
conditions as well. Nevertheless, we are able to provide strong
evidence against any ABM training effects in the current
sample of healthy participants, made possible using Bayesian
analyses. To our knowledge this is the first instance where
evidence has been provided against the presence of this
effect (as opposed to simply failing to find the effect). These
findings highlight the need for greater understanding of the
mechanisms underlying ABM. Bayesian analysis approaches
may prove to be useful tools in this quest due to their
ability to distinguish between a lack of power and lack of an
effect.
DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
The datasets for this study can be found in the open science
framework, https://osf.io/hfr9s/.
AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
SO and SBM designed the experiments. SO conducted the
experiments and performed the analyses. All authors contributed
to the final manuscript.
FUNDING
This study was funded by Australian Research Council grant
FT120100707 to SBM.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We would like to thank Chris Donkin and Robert Taylor for their
suggestions and contribution to our understanding of Bayesian
statistics.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 8 January 2019 | Volume 9 | Article 2782
fpsyg-09-02782 January 17, 2019 Time: 18:38 # 9
Onie et al. Inhibition Training on Attentional Bias Change
REFERENCES
Aczel, B., Palfi, B., Szollosi, A., Kovacs, M., Szaszi, B., Szecsi, P., et al. (2018).
Quantifying support for the null hypothesis in psychology: an empirical
investigation. Adv. Methods Pract. Psychol. Sci. 1, 357–366. doi: 10.1177/
2515245918773742
Andrews, M., and Baguley, T. (2013). Prior approval: the growth of Bayesian
methods in psychology. Br. J. Math. Stat. Psychol. 66, 1–7. doi: 10.1111/bmsp.
12004
Bar-Haim, Y., Lamy, D., Pergamin, L., Bakermans-Kranenburg, M., and van
IJzendoorn, M. (2007). Threat-related attentional bias in anxious and
nonanxious individuals: a meta-analytic study. Psychol. Bull. 133, 1–24.
doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.133.1.1
Basanovic, J., Notebaert, L., Grafton, B., Hirsch, C., and Clarke, P. (2017).
Attentional control predicts change in bias in response to attentional
bias modification. Behav. Res. Ther. 99, 47–56. doi: 10.1016/j.brat.2017.
09.002
Browning, M., Holmes, E. A., Murphy, S. E., Goodwin, G. M., and Harmer,
C. J. (2010). Lateral prefrontal cortex mediates the cognitive modification
of attentional bias. Biol. Psychiatry 67, 919–925. doi: 10.1016/j.biopsych.2009.
10.031
Button, K., Ioannidis, J., Mokrysz, C., Nosek, B., Flint, J., Robinson, E., et al. (2013).
Power failure: why small sample size undermines the reliability of neuroscience.
Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 14, 365–376. doi: 10.1038/nrn3475
Cain, M., Prinzmetal, W., Shimamura, A., and Landau, A. (2014). Improved
control of exogenous attention in action video game players. Front. Psychol.
5:69. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00069
Chen, N., Clarke, P., Watson, T., MacLeod, C., and Guastella, A. (2015). Attentional
bias modification facilitates attentional control mechanisms: evidence from
eye tracking. Biol. Psychol. 104, 139–146. doi: 10.1016/j.biopsycho.2014.
12.002
Clarke, P., Browning, M., Hammond, G., Notebaert, L., and MacLeod, C. (2014).
The causal role of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in the modification of
attentional bias: evidence from transcranial direct current stimulation. Biol.
Psychiatry 76, 946–952. doi: 10.1016/j.biopsych.2014.03.003
Clarke, P. J. F., Branson, S., Chen, N. T. M., Van Bockstaele, B., Salemink, E.,
MacLeod, C., et al. (2017). Attention bias modification training under
working memory load increases the magnitude of change in attentional
bias. J. Behav. Ther. Exp. Psychiatry 57, 25–31. doi: 10.1016/j.jbtep.2017.
02.003
Derakshan, N. D., Ansari, T. L., Hansard, M., Shoker, L., and Eysenck, M. W.
(2009). Anxiety, inhibition, efficiency, and effectiveness: an investigation using
the antisaccade task. Exp. Psychol. 56, 48–55. doi: 10.1027/1618-3169.56.1.48
Everaert, J., Mogoas¸e, C., David, D., and Koster, E. (2015). Attention bias
modification via single-session dot-probe training: failures to replicate. J. Behav.
Ther. Exp. Psychiatry 49, 5–12. doi: 10.1016/j.jbtep.2014.10.011
Eysenck, M. (1992). Anxiety. Hove: Lawrence erlbaum.
Eysenck, M., and Derakshan, N. (2011). New perspectives in attentional control
theory. Pers. Individ. Dif. 50, 955–960. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8624.2012.01738.x
Eysenck, M., Derakshan, N., Santos, R., and Calvo, M. (2007). Anxiety and
cognitive performance: attentional control theory. Emotion 7, 336–353.
doi: 10.1037/1528-3542.7.2.336
Fan, J., McCandliss, B. D., Fossella, J., Flombaum, J. I., and Posner, M. I. (2005).
The activation of attentional networks. NeuroImage 26, 471–479. doi: 10.1016/
j.neuroimage.2005.02.00
Grafton, B., Ang, C., and MacLeod, C. (2012). Always look on the bright side
of life: the attentional basis of positive affectivity. Eur. J. Pers. 26, 133–144.
doi: 10.1002/per.1842
Grafton, B., Mackintosh, B., Vujic, T., and MacLeod, C. (2014). When ignorance
is bliss: explicit instruction and the efficacy of CBM-A for anxiety. Cogn. Ther.
Res. 38, 172–188. doi: 10.1007/s10608-013-9579-3
Hedge, C., Powell, G., and Sumner, P. (2018). The reliability paradox: why robust
cognitive tasks do no produce reliable individual differences. Behav. Res.
Methods 50, 1166–1186. doi: 10.3758/s13428-017-0935-1
Heeren, A., De Raedt, R., Koster, E. H. W., and Philippot, P. (2013). The
(neuro)cognitive mechanisms behind attention bias modification in anxiety:
proposals based on theoretical accounts of attentional bias. Front. Hum.
Neurosci. 7:119. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00119
Heeren, A., Mogoas¸e, C., McNally, R. J., Schmitz, A., and Philippot, P. (2015).
Does attention bias modification improve attentional control? A double-blind
randomized experiment with individuals with social anxiety disorder. J. Anxiety
Disord. 29, 35–42. doi: 10.1016/j.janxdis.2014.10.007
Iacoviello, B. M., Wu, G., Abend, R., Murrough, J. W., Feder, A., Fruchter, E.,
et al. (2014). Attention bias variability and symptoms of posttraumatic stress
disorder. J. Trauma. Stress 27, 232–239. doi: 10.1002/jts.21899
Jeffreys, H. (1961). Theory of Probability, 3rd Edn. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Jin, D., Onie, S., Curby, K., and Most, S. (2018). Aversive images
cause less perceptual interference among violent video game players:
evidence from emotion-induced blindness. Vis. Cogn. [Preprint]. doi:
10.1080/13506285.2018.1553223
Kanyongo, G., Brook, G., Kyei-Blankson, L., and Gocmen, G. (2007). Reliability
and statistical power: how measurement fallibility affects power and required
sample sizes for several parametric and nonparametric statistics. J. Mod. Appl.
Stat. Methods 6, 81–90. doi: 10.22237/jmasm/1177992480
Kruijt, A., Field, A., and Fox, E. (2018). Capturing dynamics of biased attention:
are new attention variability measures the way forward? PLoS One 11:e0166600.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0166600
Kruschke, J. K. (2015). Doing Bayesian Data Analysis: A Tutorial with R, JAGS and
Stan, 2nd Edn. Cambridge, MA: Academic Press.
Lang, P. J., Bradley, M. M., and Cuthbert, B. N. (1997). International Affective
Picture System (IAPS): Technical Manual and Affective Ratings. Gainesville, FL:
NIMH Center for the Study of Emotion and Attention.
Lovibond, P., and Lovibond, S. (1995). The structure of negative emotional states:
comparison of the Depression Anxiety Stress Scales (DASS) with the beck
depression and anxiety inventories. Behav. Res. Ther. 33, 335–343. doi: 10.1016/
0005-7967(94)00075-U
MacLeod, C., and Clarke, P. (2015). The attentional bias modification
approach to anxiety intervention. Clin. Psychol. Sci. 3, 58–78. doi: 10.1177/
2167702614560749
MacLeod, C., Mathews, A., and Tata, P. (1986). Attentional bias in emotional
disorders. J. Abnorm. Psychol. 95, 15–20. doi: 10.1037/0021-843X.
95.1.15
Mathews, A., and MacLeod, C. (2002). Induced processing biases have causal
effects on anxiety. Cogn. Emot. 16, 331–354. doi: 10.1080/0269993014300
0518
McNally, R. (2018). Attentional bias for threat: crisis or opportunity? Clin. Psychol.
Rev. doi: 10.1016/j.cpr.2018.05.005 [Epub ahead of print].
Milkins, B., Notebaert, L., MacLeod, C., and Clarke, P. (2016). The potential
benefits of targeted attentional bias modification on cognitive arousal and sleep
quality in worry-related sleep disturbance. Clin. Psychol. Sci. 4, 1015–1027.
doi: 10.1177/2167702615626898
Most, S., Chun, M., Widders, D., and Zald, D. (2005). Attentional rubbernecking:
cognitive control and personality in emotion-induced blindness. Psychon. Bull.
Rev. 12, 654–661. doi: 10.3758/BF03196754
Notebaert, L., Clarke, P., Grafton, B., and MacLeod, C. (2015). Validation of a novel
attentional bias modification task: the future may be in the cards. Behav. Res.
Ther. 65, 93–100. doi: 10.1016/j.brat.2014.12.007
Nunnally, J. C. (1978). Psychometric Theory, 2nd Edn. New York, NY: McGraw-
Hill.
Onie, S., and Most, S. (2017). Two roads diverged: distinct mechanisms of
attentional bias differentially predict negative affect and persistent negative
thought. Emotion 17, 884–894. doi: 10.1037/emo0000280
Posner, M. I., Cohen, Y., and Rafal, R. D. (1982). Neural systems control of
spatial orienting. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. Ser. B Biol. Sci. 298, 187–198.
doi: 10.1098/rstb.1982.0081
Price, R. B., Kuckertz, J. M., Siegle, G. J., Ladouceur, C. D., Silk, J. S., Ryan,
N. D., et al. (2015). Empirical recommendations for improving the stability
of the dot-probe task in clinical research. Psychol. Assess. 27, 365–376.
doi: 10.1037/pas0000036
Price, R. B., Wallace, M., Kuckertz, J. M., Amir, N., Graur, S., Cummings, L., et al.
(2016). Pooled patient-level meta-analysis of children and adults completing a
computer-based anxiety intervention targeting attentional bias. Clin. Psychol.
Rev. 50, 37–49. doi: 10.1016/j.cpr.2016.09.009
Rouder, J., and Morey, R. (2012). Default bayes factors for model selection in
regression. Multivariate Behav. Res. 47, 877–903. doi: 10.1080/00273171.2012.
734737
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 9 January 2019 | Volume 9 | Article 2782
fpsyg-09-02782 January 17, 2019 Time: 18:38 # 10
Onie et al. Inhibition Training on Attentional Bias Change
Schmukle, S. (2005). Unreliability of the dot probe task. Eur. J. Pers. 19, 595–605.
doi: 10.1002/per.554
Theeuwes, J. (1992). Perceptual selectivity for color and form. Percept. Psychophys.
51, 599–606. doi: 10.3758/BF03211656
Van Bockstaele, B., Verschuere, B., Tibboel, H., De Houwer, J., Crombez, G., and
Koster, E. H. (2014). A review of current evidence for the causal impact of
attentional bias on fear and anxiety. Psychol. Bull. 140, 682–721. doi: 10.1037/
a0034834
Wagenmakers, E. J., Beek, T. F., Rotteveel, M., Gierholz, A., Matzke, D.,
Steingroever, H., et al., (2015). Turning the hands of time again: a purely
confirmatory replication study and a bayesian analysis. Front. Psychol. 6:494.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00494
Wieser, M., Pauli, P., and Mühlberger, A. (2009). Probing the attentional
control theory in social anxiety: an emotional saccade task.
Cogn. Affect. Behav. Neurosci. 9, 314–322. doi: 10.3758/CABN.9.
3.314
Zinbarg, R. E., Revelle, W., Yovel, I., and Li, W. (2005). Cronbach’s α, Revelle’s
β, and McDonald’s ωH : their relations with each other and two alternative
conceptualizations of reliability. Psychometrika 70, 123–133. doi: 10.1007/
s11336-003-0974-7
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was
conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could
be construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Copyright © 2019 Onie, Notebaert, Clarke and Most. This is an open-access article
distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY).
The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the
original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original
publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice.
No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these
terms.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 10 January 2019 | Volume 9 | Article 2782
